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FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT IN LEGAL ETHICS:
SOME MID-COURSE CORRECTIONS TO
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE
DAVID LUBAN*

David Wasserman's criticisms go to the most theoretical and
philosophical portions of my argument in Lawyers and Justice:1 the
theory of role morality and the analysis of the moral authority of
law. 2 At the same time, Wasserman's objections implicate practical
issues at the heart of legal ethics, and thus their import is by no
means merely technical or scholastic. I found much of his essay convincing, and therefore read it with mixed emotions: pleasure at the
acuteness of his analysis, and chagrin at the thought that if he is
right then it is back to the drawing board for my own argument.
On further reflection, however, I am not persuaded that Wasserman is right, nor even that his reconstruction of my view is one
that I wish to accept. If it is not, the fault is no doubt mine. When I
wrote Lawyers and Justice, I made a conscious decision to keep the
discussion of issues of academic moral theory to a minimum. As a
result, however, I was far from explicit concerning several important
philosophical questions; neglecting them was no great sacrifice,
since it relieved me of the burden of having to make up my mind
about difficult issues that no one ever gets right anyway. (Moral philosophy is like the clarinet, the instrument Benny Goodman once
defined as "an ill woodwind that nobody blows good.") Wasserman's essay provides a welcome occasion to face the music.

* Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland at College Park. B.A., University of Chicago, 1970; M.A., 1973; M. Phil., 1973; Ph.D., Yale University, 1974. I am grateful to
Alan Strudler and David Wasserman for extensive conversations about this paper, and
to Judith Lichtenberg and Deborah Rhode for several helpful suggestions. I found myself in the unusual position of discussing my reply to David Wasserman with him as I
wrote it. For that reason, I shall alter the usual disclaimer: while the mistakes in my
response are entirely my own, any misrepresentations of Wasserman's position in the
current paper are his fault as much as mine.
1. D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988).
2. I leave to one side his section on the right to legal services. In that section,
Wasserman discusses my views in tandem with those of Alan Wertheimer. His criticisms
are directed at Wertheimer, and concern points at which I too diverge from Wertheimer.
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AN EQUIVOCATION IN LAWYERS AND JUSTICE

It will be useful to begin the discussion with an example, the
Garrow case I described in Lawyers andJustice:
Lawyers Frank Belge and Frank Armani were told by their
client Robert Garrow, who was accused of murdering a student camping near Lake Pleasant, New York, of two other
murders he had committed. They found and photographed the bodies but kept the information to themselves
for half a year-this despite the fact that the father of one
of the victims, knowing that Armani was representing an
accused murderer, personally approached him to ask if he
knew anything about his missing daughter.3
Armani met with the father but then, nervous and shaken, reneged
on an appointment with the other victim's father at the last moment.
Months later, after the truth came out, he found himself similarly
unable to answer a letter from the sister of one of the victims asking
him to explain himself. In a television interview with Fred Graham,
Armani reflected on his dilemma:
Armani: This was something that was really momentous for us because of the conflict within us. Your mind
screaming one way "Relieve these parents!" You knowwhat is your responsibility? Should you report this?
Shouldn't you report it? One sense of morality wants you
to relieve the grief.
Graham: And the other?
Armani: The other is your sworn duty.

Graham: Didn't you think that there was a factor ofjust
common decency here?
Armani: I can't explain it-but to me it was a question
of which was the higher moral good.
Graham: Between what?
Armani: The question of the Constitution, the question of even a bastard like him having a proper defense,
having adequate representation, being able to trust his lawyer as to what he says.
Graham: Against what?
Armani: As against the fact that I have a dead girl, the
fact that her body's there. As against the breaking hearts of
her parents. But they are-[pause]. It's a terrible thing to
play God at that moment, but in my judgment-and I still
3. D.

LUBAN,

supra note 1, at 53.
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feel that way-that their suffering is not worth jeopardizing
my sworn duty or my oath of office or the Constitution. 4
That excruciating moral dilemma (and its less excruciating, because less extreme, counterparts) motivates the moral theory of
chapters six through eight of Lawyers andJustice: on the one hand,
the parents' breaking hearts, on the other, a lawyer's sworn duty.
On the one hand, the commands of what in Lawyers and Justice I
termed "common morality": to assuage the parents' heart-breaking
uncertainty; to expedite the honorable burial of the dead women
rather than allowing them to rot in deserted mine-shafts and cemetery underbrush; to speak truths rather than carefully-worded evasions; to aid in the punishment or incapacitation of a cruel rapist
and murderer rather than fighting for his welfare. On the other
hand, the commands of a lawyer's "role morality": to keep faith
with his client, to hold Garrow's disclosures in confidence, to represent his interests with true zeal.
This is the "problem of role morality" that I analyze in chapters
six and seven. I argue that the appeal to role morality-to the lawyer's sworn duty-amounts to an institutionalexcuse from the requirements of common morality. That is, it tacitly appeals to the
importance of the lawyer's role in a morally worthy institution.
Here is my analysis in Lawyers andJustice of the institutional excuse in
the Garrow case:
The lawyers' role acts (preserving the defendant's confidences, photographing the bodies but telling nobody) were
required by the general duty of confidentiality-the role
obligation. This is justified by arguments that confidentiality is required in order to guarantee an adequate criminal
defense-the institutional task .

. .

. The next step is to

show that zealous criminal defense is required by the adversary system, and this in turn . . . serves the positive

moral good of overprotecting individual rights against the
encroachments of the state.5
In other words, I read Armani's appeal to his "sworn duty" as a kind
of abbreviation for the four-step argument that I believe constitutes
the structure of an institutional excuse. I refer to this four-step argument as the "Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning," or "fourfold root" for short, and explicate it as follows:
4. Ethics on Trial (WETA-TV video 1987).
5. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 149. In tying Armani's duty to the adversary system, I
follow Monroe Freedman's analysis of the Garrow case. M. FREEDMAN, LAYWERS' ETHICS
IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-8 (1975).
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[T]he institutional excuse, fully spelled out, will take the
form I have indicated: the agent (1) justifies the institution
by demonstrating its moral goodness; (2) justifies the role
by appealing to the structure of the institution; (3) justifies
the role obligations by showing that they are essential to
the role; and (4) justifies the role act by showing that the
obligations require it.6
This analysis is intended to explain the origin and force of a lawyer's
role obligations-Armani's "sworn duty." Professional duties must
originate somewhere; they are not dark ancestral mysteries that
command our reverence because their origins are lost in the depths
of time. They arise from the requirements of social institutions
(such as our adversary system) the rationality of which must be appraised with a generous yet skeptical eye. Once we see this we understand that the weight of professional obligations is finite,
bounded above by the weighted product of the worth of the institution, the centrality of the professional role to that institution, and
the importance to that role of a putative professional duty.
Few of us believe that our common moral obligations are so
absolute that we can never violate them regardless of the consequences. Rather, moral obligations are typically prima facie obligations, that is, obligations that may be overridden in special
circumstances. 7 Thus, whenever a lawyer faces a dilemma between
doing her "sworn duty" and following the dictates of common morality, she must ask whether the moral wrong involved in doing her
sworn duty overrides the prima facie obligation it imposes. The
fourfold root is meant to specify, in schematic form, the factors determining the moral weight of the professional obligation.
The major conclusion I drew in chapter eight of Lawyers andJustice is twofold. First, in the paradigm situation of criminal defensea relatively powerless defendant confronted by the full weight of the
state-the adversary system is a moral good sufficient to underwrite
6. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 131. The name "Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning" was intended as an easy-to-remember name and also a weak witticism, alluding to

Arthur Schopenhauer's book

ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT

REASON (1813). I now heartily repent the choice of labels: the Schopenhauer allusion is
pointless as well as obscure, and most readers find the term "the fourfold root of sufficient reasoning" awkward. I will retain the term as a permanent reminder to its penitent
author of the perils of trying to be clever.
7. This is not to say that no moral obligations are absolute: the moral prohibition on
genocide, just to take the most extreme and obvious example, is surely an absolute prohibition (what could override it?). The point is rather that more mundane moral obligations-promise-keeping, truth-telling, courtesy, and so forth-can be overridden in
unusual circumstances.
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very powerful institutional excuses8 and is also an important device
for maintaining the proper relationship between state and citizen.
Not without qualms, I concur with Monroe Freedman that Armani
and Beige did the right thing.9
Second, however, in the civil suit paradigm-by which I mean
relatively evenly-matched adversaries neither of which is the state or
even a powerful, state-like institution-the adversary system is justified much more weakly, and cannot support weighty institutional excuses, for the most common justifications of the adversary system all
fail. These include its alleged superiority as an engine of truth and a
protector of rights, its supposedly self-correcting character, the
moral praiseworthiness of the attorney-client relation it creates, and
its centrality to our tradition. In the civil suit paradigm, the only
persuasive argument on behalf of the adversary system is a bare appeal to the status quo: the adversary system is not demonstrably
worse than the available alternatives. If we had a nonadversary system as the status quo, the same argument would justify retaining
that system. This, I argue, is too slender a reed to support hefty
institutional excuses. On the basis of these arguments, I propose a
more-or-less drastic rethinking of the lawyer's role, away from a
stance of extreme partisanship without common moral accountability toward what I term "moral activism."'"
But let us return to Armani's dilemma. Implicit in Armani's eloquent framing of the problem we find yet another contrast: on the
one hand, an ethics of consequences (the parents' breaking hearts),
on the other, an ethics of duty. Moral philosophers distinguish between consequentialist moral theories (such as utilitarianism), which
evaluate actions in terms of their consequences, and deontological
moral theories, which evaluate actions in terms of duties and obligations partly or wholly independently of consequences."1 To borrow
W.D. Ross's terminology, consequentialists give priority to the
8. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 148. Even in the criminal defense paradigm, however,
the adversary system cannot excuse everything. See id. at 156. For examples of controversial criminal defense tactics that I claim the adversary system cannot excuse, see id.at
150-52 (cross-examining the truthful rape complainant to make her "look like a
whore"); id. at 197-201 (perjurious client).
9. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 2.
10. See D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 160-61.
11. Utilitarianism is the best-known consequentialist theory. As I use the term, utilitarianism is simply one special case of consequentialism: utilitarianism may be defined
as that form of consequentialism that (a) ranks outcomes of action solely according to
how much welfare they produce (where welfare may be explicated in terms of pleasure
and pain, or in terms of the satisfaction of human preferences), and (b) determines total
welfare levels by summing the welfares of all affected individuals. This characterization
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goodness of outcomes ("the good") while deontologists emphasize2
the rightness of actions independently of outcomes ("the right").'
Deontologists stress the importance of refraining from certain actions that are in and of themselves morally repugnant, even if they
lead to desirable outcomes.
Armani's own language frames his dilemma-common morality
or role morality?-as a clash between consequences and duty. It is
by no means necessary to frame the dilemma this way, since common
morality itself contains important deontological components-after
all, the common moral obligation to honor the dead that Armani
violated can be more readily understood in deontological than consequentialist terms. Moreover, I shall argue that role morality must
be understood in terms that, if not entirely consequentialist, still pay
a lot of attention to consequences. Finally-an important warningthese are by no means the only or even the most important alternatives. Indeed, later in this Essay I will argue that my own approach
in Lawyers andJustice moves off at an oblique angle from the line connecting consequentialism and deontology."3 I bring up the overworked and jejune theoretical debate between consequentialists and
deontologists because Wasserman has persuaded me that I waffled
between two approaches in Lawyers andJustice's theory of role morality, one of which is straightforwardly consequentialist and the other
of which appears to be deontological (though Wasserman does not
call it that and-as we shall see-it need not be understood that
way).
The consequentialist reading appears most vividly in the Oxfam
example I employed to motivate the fourfold root argument.' 4 The
example amounts to a kind of "for want of a nail the kingdom was
lost" story: because the Oxfam logistics officer obeys the dictates of
common morality, P (the local boss) withholds the trucks; because P
withholds the trucks, the food does not get delivered; because the
food does not get delivered, many innocent lives are lost. Although
I insisted in Lawyers andJustice that this is not a simple consequentialist problem,1 5 Wasserman surely is right that the example trades in

of utilitarianism-as sum-ranking welfarist consequentialism-comes from UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 3-4 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
12. W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 1 (1930).
13. See infra notes 52, 76-78 and accompanying text.
14. Wasserman quotes this example in his article, so I shall not repeat it here. See
Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing?: David Luban on the Morality of Adversary Representation (Review Essay), 49 MD. L. REV. 392, 396-97 (1990).
15. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 130-31.

430

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:424

large part on our consequentialist values and intuitions.' 6 The example suggests that we determine whether a role obligation should
be overridden in a particular case by asking whether the damage
done to the institution's mission by defaulting from the role obligation in that case outweighs the good accomplished by breaking the
role. 7
It comes as a small surprise that outside of contrived examples
such as the Oxfam case the answer is often "no": had Belge and
Armani violated Garrow's confidence the damage to the practice of
lawyer confidentiality surely would have been slight, and indeed far
too slight to outweigh the good that violating confidentiality in this
one case would accomplish. 8 Similarly, an occasional lapse from
zealous representation of a particularly repulsive and dangerous
criminal defendant would not do much damage to criminal defense
as a whole, and might do a lot of good. (Let us suppose that we are
considering only cases in which the crime has been violent and ugly,
the criminal is unrepentant, and the proposed sentence is neither
disproportionate nor racially motivated.) 9 Wasserman therefore
16. But see infra note 29 for further discussion of the Oxfam example.
17. This reading of the fourfold root is reinforced when I suggest that in employing
the fourfold root "we keep a 'running total' of justificatory strength ... which comes
into play when we finally wonder what to do." D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 135; see also id.

at 140 (spelling out the procedure of assessment).
18. This is Wasserman's conclusion, and I agree with it. It is possible, however, that
Wasserman and I are wrong about this; after all, if Garrow's lawyers violated confidentiality the case would have received widespread publicity, and in that event it is possible
that public reliance on lawyers' commitment to confidentiality would have been severely
damaged.
I doubt this for two reasons, however. First, the facts of the Garrow case were so
unusual that the lawyers would most likely have had no difficulty convincing the general
public that in less extreme circumstances the duty of confidentiality would have bound
them. Second, it is unlikely in any case that the public believes confidentiality to be
inviolable. Fewer than half the clients surveyed in a recent study conducted by Fred
Zacharias believed that the confidentiality rules are absolute. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REV. 351, 383 (1989). Zacharias queried the subjects concerning a
dozen hypotheticals presenting strong temptation to betray client confidences. In 9 of
the hypotheticals, 40-60% of those surveyed believed that lawyers are permitted to disclose under current confidentiality rules, and at least 28.8% believed that disclosure is
permitted in all of the hypotheticals. Id. at 394. Given that so many people already
believe that lawyers are permitted to violate confidentiality in problem cases, I doubt
that Garrow's lawyers would have drastically undermined confidentiality by disclosing
where the bodies were buried.
19. Without this stipulation, we may believe that subjecting the defendant to punishment is itself immoral. Many people believe (a) that our prisons are so horrible that it is
never, or almost never, justifiable to incarcerate anyone in them; or (b) that non-probation sentences are typically far too harsh to "fit the crime"; or (c) that our criminal
justice system has become ineluctably racist, and hence immoral; or (d) that nonviolent
crimes against property committed by desperately poor or underclass offenders, and
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concludes that the logic of the fourfold root ought to force me to
just such conclusions. 2 0
The point is that the marginal harms to the system that result
from violating one's professional duty typically are slight in a single
case. On the other side of the ledger, the marginal benefits of following common morality rather than professional duty may be
great. Thus, when common morality clashes with role morality the
exceptional cases in which the duty must be overridden simply devour the duty itself; role morality usually loses. And this is what
Wasserman fears my fourfold root argument implies. Wasserman
writes that the fourfold root "is really a form of 'sophisticated' act
consequentialism, taking account of roles, policies, and acts only to
the extent that they bear on the consequences of specific acts."'" I
said earlier that enormous practical consequences are embroiled in
the theoretical issues Wasserman raises: here we have a perfect example. For if this consequentialist reading of the fourfold root argument is correct, the argument would virtually abolish the
22
attorney-client relationship as we know it.
The fourfold root, however, can be sung in a deontological
rather than a consequentialist key. I have said that in the final step
of the fourfold root analysis, an agent "justifies the role act by showing that the obligations require it."2 3 This language lends itself to a
paradigmatically deontological reading. Question: Why should
Armani keep Garrow's confidences? Answer: Because the obligation
victimless crimes, do not deserve punishment at all: or (e) that punishment as such is
simply a barbaric institution incapable of moral justification. I disagree entirely with (e),
and partly with (a), since it may prove even more horrible simply to release every offender, no matter how dangerous; incarceration will be justifiable in many cases as a
lesser evil. For the record, I believe that only in some cases, and to a limited degree, will
(d) be true, though I agree with (b) and (c). In any event, we are stipulating that (a)-(d)
do not apply in the cases we are considering.
20. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 400 (Garrow case); id. at 401-02 (zeal in criminal
defense).
21. Id. at 395.
22. This statement stands in need of qualification, which is explained most readily in
the somewhat artificial language of costs and benefits. Even if Wasserman is right, a
criminal defense lawyer should default on the traditional attorney-client relationship
only when enough other lawyers are not defaulting that the marginal damage to the relationship is less than the marginal benefit of defaulting. If all lawyers defaulted, then the
relationship would be destroyed, and we are assuming that in the usual criminal defense
situation this would be unacceptable. It follows that at some point the marginal damage
to the relationship caused by one's defaulting must exceed the marginal benefits: it
cannot be that in each individual case the marginal benefit of defaulting exceeds the
marginal harm, but that the total harm over all cases exceeds the total benefit. See D.
REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 61-62 (1980).
23. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 131.
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of confidentiality requires him to. Period. Armani can offer this deontological-sounding answer (remember that he spoke of "my
sworn duty, my oath of office") without engaging in a consequentialist weighing of the marginal benefits against the marginal damage to
the adversary system from breaking confidentiality in a single case.
But if Armani is simply to appeal to the duties of his lawyerly
station, what is the point of the fourfold root argument? Is it not to
facilitate such a consequentialist weighing? After all, I offered the
fourfold root as an alternative to settling the problem of role morality
simply by appealing to "my station and its duties. '"24
The point of the fourfold root on this deontological reading is,
as it happens, quite straightforward. The fourfold root inquiry
helps Armani determine how strong the duty of confidentiality really is, in order to decide whether the appalling circumstances of the
Garrow case suffice to override it.
Remember that even deontological duties are often prima facie
rather than absolute; they can be overridden in exceptional cases.
But how exceptional must a case be to override a duty? That depends not only on the details of the case but also on the strength of
the duty. Duty is duty, but all duties are not created equal. Not
even all duties of the same type are created equal. Consider, for
example, the duty to keep one's word. If I say "I absolutely promise
I'll call you tomorrow" my duty is stronger than if I say merely "I'll
call you tomorrow," and the latter duty is stronger than if I say "I'll
see if I can get back to you tomorrow." All three expressions
amount to giving my word that I will call you tomorrow.2 5 But the
first can be overridden only by a grave emergency, the second by a
variety of unanticipated difficulties that keep me from the telephone,
and the third merely because I am rather busy.
The purpose of the fourfold root inquiry, then, is simply to determine the strength of the professional duty. Let us suppose we
determine that the duty is strong, because the institution has strong
moral justification, the role is central to the institution, and the duty
in question is crucial to the role (even if violating it in a single case
will not damage the role). We have then determined that the duty
can be overridden only in grave emergencies, and not simply in any
case in which the benefits of violating the duty outweigh the costs.
In legal terms, the difference between the two interpretations of
24. See id. at 120-25, 137-39.
25. One might object that in the third expression I do not literally commit myself to
calling you. But the expression is not meant to be taken literally: it is an idiomatic way
of indicating a weak commitment to call you.
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the fourfold root is roughly equivalent to the difference between a
balancing test and a rebuttable-or, as philosophers usually put it,
"defeasible"-presumption. The consequentialist reading asks for
a straightforward balancing of the consequences of doing one's duty
against the consequences of violating one's duty. The deontological
reading grants a presumption in behalf of doing one's duty-the
strength of the presumption to be determined by the fourfold root
inquiry-which nonetheless may be defeated in exceptional cases.
The practical difference is that the threshold for defeating the presumption is higher than the threshold for tipping the balance. Only
in rather grave cases should Armani default on his duty. (One
might, by the way, accept all this and still disagree with me about the
Garrow case, believing that the sensational and disturbing circumstances of that case created a grave enough emergency to override
even a very strong duty of confidentiality. As I wrote in Lawyers and
Justice, "any moral theory that allows you to answer hard questions
confidently is simple-minded." 2 6 )
This way of understanding the fourfold root avoids the unpleasant result of the first, consequentialist interpretation, namely the extreme attenuation of professional duty that it implies. As
Wasserman argues, in Lawyers andJustice I implicitly rely on this "deontological" understanding of the fourfold root argument in my
resolution of the Garrow case, in my general argument for strong
obligations of zeal in criminal defense, and in my argument in chapter nine on behalf of the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases. 2 7
Wasserman charges me with faulty reasoning in all three of these
instances, but that is because he assumes that I have opted for the
first, consequentialist understanding of the fourfold root.
To sum up, Lawyers and Justice equivocates between two understandings of institutional excuses, which I have characterized as
"consequentialist" and "deontological." (Shortly I shall suggest
that this is not quite the right way to characterize them, but the
names may stand for the moment.) I am grateful to Wasserman for
pointing out this equivocation which, quite frankly, I had not noticed when I wrote the book. I am not entirely surprised at the
equivocation, since I confess to a certain amount of vacillation between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist sympathies. 28
26. D. LUBAN, supra note 1,at 152.
27. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 400-02.
28. As-Judith Lichtenberg puts it,
Some days, I think I am a consequentialist; some days, I am sure I am not. Is it
simply that I cannot make up my mind? Or is it that the meaning of consequen-
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Having noticed the equivocation, I now wish to plump for the
second, "deontological," reading of the fourfold root-at least until
Wasserman or others can convince me that this, too, lands me in hot
water. On the deontological reading my resolution of the Garrow
case, my argument for zealous advocacy in the criminal defense paradigm, and my defense of the attorney-client privilege in criminal
cases follow smoothly, or at least as smoothly as they would have if I
had clearly enunciated the deontological reading of the fourfold
root in the first place.2 9
The deontological reading requires me to modify and deepen
the general approach to thinking about social roles I sketched in
chapter six of Lawyers andJustice, in which I concluded with the consequentialist solution to the problem of role morality that I have
now repudiated:
[T]he appeal to a role in moral justification is simply a
shorthand method of appealing to the moral reasons incorporated in that role. And these may be-must be-balanced against the moral reasons for breaking the role
expressed in common morality. In forming our all-thingsconsidered judgment, the reasons for acting in role will
sometimes outweigh the reasons for breaking the role; but
sometimes they will not.
Let me say straightaway that I believe that some version of this simpleminded balancing approach is the solution to our problem.a"
The first sentence is right, but Wasserman has persuaded me that
the rest of the passage is an error. For on the reading of the fourtialism refuses to stay still? One thing seems sure: An approach to ethics that
seems by turns as if it must be right, as if it cannot be right, and as if it misconceives the crucial questions shows all the signs of striking a deep philosophical
chord.
Lichtenberg, The Right, the All Right, and the Good, 92 YALE L.J. 544, 544 (1983).
29. It is interesting to observe how the Oxfam example lends itself ambiguously to
both a consequentialist and a deontological reading. We already have seen that our
sympathy for the logistics officer's institutional excuse may rest on consequentialist intuitions (one life versus many). The deontological reading of the fourfold root argument,
however, yields the same outcome: Oxfam is an institution that serves a central moral
good, the logistics officer plays a vital role in that organization, and negotiating with
local officials to obtain trucks is one of the key duties of the logistics officer. Thus, her
professional duty is very strong, and can be overridden in only the most dire emergencies. I concocted the Oxfam example to motivate the fourfold root argument because I
thought it was a relatively easy case. We may now see that it seems relatively easy precisely because it bridges the divide between consequentialism and deontology in the
Oxfam case our consequentialist and deontological intuitions concur in the result.
30. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 125 (emphasis in original).
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fold root that I now endorse, the moral reasons incorporated in the
role must not simply be balanced against the reasons for breaking
the role; rather, role obligations should be regarded as defeasible
presumptions. Treating role obligations as defeasible presumptions
implies an important asymmetry between role morality and common
morality, since role morality becomes in effect the "default" position, and thus takes precedence over common morality. In Section
II, I shall return to the implications of treating role morality in this
fashion. 3 '
Apart from this important correction, I believe and hope that
the practical conclusions of Lawyers and Justice do not depend on
equivocation between the consequentialist and deontological readings of the fourfold root, but rather follow from the deontological
reading that I now endorse.
Before proceeding, however, I want to explore the difference
between the two readings a bit more carefully, since I believe that
here Wasserman goes astray.
Wasserman believes that the equivocation arises in the connection between duties and acts, that is, at link four of the fourfold
root. 3 2 He notices that in the Oxfam example, the role-act (in this

case it is an omission rather than an act) of keeping silent about the
murder is causally (or, as Wasserman says, "instrumentally") necessary to fulfill the role obligation of obtaining trucks.3" If the logistics officer warns the murder-victim, she sets in motion a chain of
events resulting in her failing to obtain the trucks. This corresponds with judging the role-act by its consequences. In the Garrow
case, however, the role-act of keeping Garrow's confidences is logically, not causally, required by the duty of confidentiality-it is (in
Wasserman's words) " 'required' only in the trivial sense that keeping silent is required to fulfill the duty to keep silent." 3 4 And this
looks very much like judging the role-act deontologically, that is, by
its correspondence to duty.
The equivocation here is only apparent, however, for there is
really no significant difference between the two cases. In the Oxfam
case, the logistics officer's duty to negotiate with local officials to
31. See infra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
32. Link one consists of the institution and its justification. Link two is a role
and its derivation from the institution's requirements. Link three is a role obligation and its derivation from the role's requirements. And link four is a role
act and the demonstration that it is an instance of the role obligation.
D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 132.
33. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 397.
34. Id. at 399.
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,obtain trucks logically requires that she negotiate with P to obtain
trucks. That, in turn, causally requires her to keep silent about the
murder P is planning. In the Garrow case, Armani's duty to keep
client confidences logically required that he keep Garrow's confidences. That, in turn, causally required that he do several other
things-lying or evading direct questions about whether he knew
the location of the bodies, cancelling his appointment with the victim's father because he feared that his self-control would crack, surreptitiously changing cars to ensure that he was not being followed
when he drove out to photograph the bodies, and so forth.
The point is that a role-"act" is often a complex performance
consisting of other acts. This is true in both the Oxfam and Garrow
cases. In both cases, in other words, the role-act logically required
by the role obligation causally requires other acts-and it is these
other acts that demand institutional excuses. Sometimes, of course,
the role-act is itself simple and does not causally require other acts.
In that case, the only question is whether the role-act actually is required by the role obligation-the typical lawyer's question of the
scope of an obligation. Sometimes, on the other hand, the role obligation obviously requires the role-act. In that case, the only question is how, instrumentally, to carry it out. Thus, in some cases
determining the logical requirements of a role obligation is trivial;
in other cases determining the causal requirements of the obligation
is trivial; in still other cases, both may be trivial. But this difference
shows no equivocation in the fourfold root argument and has nothing to do with the two readings of the fourfold root that I have
discussed.
The real difference between the consequentialist and deontological readings of the fourfold root emerges in link three, the derivation of specific professional duties from the requirements of the
professional role. Typically, we ask whether the role could be carried out if no such duty were imposed: we ask, for example, if lawyers could represent clients successfully if there were no duty of
confidentiality. To answer this question, we ask what would happen
if lawyers were permitted to reveal client confidences at will. The
most common answer is that in a world in which lawyers were permitted to reveal client confidences at will, clients would conceal information from their lawyers that might prove vital for successful, or
even minimally competent, representation. We then conclude that
confidentiality is an important role obligation of lawyers.3 5
35. For a more detailed and nuanced discussion of confidentiality, see D. LUBAN,
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I spell the argument out in this rather pedantic fashion to show
that in its logical structure it is a generalizationargument: it shows that
confidentiality is a duty by asking "what if every lawyer was permitted to reveal client confidences?" and answering that the lawyer's
role would prove impossible. The "what if everyone did that... ?"
locution is the hallmark of a generalization argument.3 6
The consequentialist interpretation of the fourfold root inquiry
involves no such generalization argument. Instead of asking "what
would happen to the adversary system if everyone revealed client
confidences?", the consequentialist interpretation asks only "what
would happen to the adversary system if I reveal client confidences
(and everyone else acted as they do now)?" It is because the consequentialist interpretation refuses to generalize that it plumps so unequivocally in favor of revealing Garrow's dreadful secret.
Generalization arguments are among the most common forms
of moral persuasion we use. They also bear a strong link to deontological moral theory because of the role they play in the philosophy
of Kant, the paradigm deontologist. Kant argued that a moral law
necessarily binds all moral agents, so that the test of a maxim is its
"universalizability": "Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law."3 " Though this formula is notoriously hard to interpret, it
clearly involves generalization arguments. Indeed, on the PoggeScanlon interpretation that I find most plausible, Kant's formula
means:
An agent can assume that he is permitted to adopt a particular maxim just in case he can will that everyone should be
permitted to adopt it. To check this, he must then imagine a
world like ours-with the one modification that everyone
feels (morally) free to adopt his maxim.3 8

supra note 1, at 177-234, where I argue for several limitations on confidentiality, most
notably in cases in which the client is an organization rather than a natural person. See
also Zacharias, supra note 18, at 376-96 (noting serious doubts about the extent to which
this argument for the importance of confidentiality rests on sound empirical
assumptions).

36. See M. SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN THE LOGIC OF ETHICS,
WITH THE RUDIMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 61 (1961) ("The generalization argument has the general form: 'If everyone were to do X, the consequences would
be disastrous (or undesirable); therefore no one ought to do X.' ").
37. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Beck trans. 1959).
38. T. Pogge, The Categorical Imperative 2 (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis in original) (copy on file with author). Pogge takes this "universal permission"
reading of the categorical imperative from T. Scanlon, Kant's Groundwork: From Free-
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The argument I sketched above concerning confidentiality fits this
schema quite comfortably.
Generalization arguments, however, are standard factory-installed equipment in consequentialism as well. In the literature of
utilitarianism, they emerged in response to the difficulty Wasserman
discovered in the consequentialist interpretation of the fourfold
root, namely the tendency of consequentialist theories to devour
our duties, because we must violate duties any time the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs.
In its most disturbing form, the problem is that utilitarianism
(the most popular and often-discussed consequentialist theory)
sometimes requires intrinsically horrible actions-actions that violate our profoundest deontological duties-simply because these actions maximize utility. If I can save five lives by murdering one
person (to use his organs for transplants, for example), utilitarianism seems to require that I do so.
Philosophers concerned with this worry address it by distinguishing between the utility of individual acts and the utility of rules
or general policies. It may be that committing a murder to save five
lives would be best on utilitarian grounds, but a general rule requiring agents to commit murders whenever they believe that doing so
will save several lives will create so much fear and anxiety, and lead
to so many pointless murders, that it creates less utility than a blanket prohibition against murder. Similarly, it may on occasion prove
beneficial to punish an innocent person (because, for example, we
cannot find the true perpetrator of a crime and we need to punish
someone for the sake of deterrence). Nevertheless, a social institution of punishing innocents clearly would create enormous
disutility.
Philosophers, therefore, distinguish act-consequentialism, which
evaluates the rightness of each act by appraising its consequences,
from rule-consequentialism,which evaluates the rightness of each act by
appraising the consequences of general rules requiring or permitting such acts.3 9 Rule-consequentialism seems to accord better with
dom to Moral Community (July 1983) (three unpublished lectures) (copy on file with
author).
39. The distinction was made famous by Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3
(1955), though it appeared two decades before Rawls's article in Harrod, Utilitarianism
Revised, 45 MIND 137 (1936). J.O. Urmson traced rule-utilitarianism all the way back to
John Stuart Mill in Urmson, The Interpretationof the Moral Philosophy ofJ.S. Mill, 3 PHIL. Q
33 (1953). It should be noted that philosophers often distinguish rule-utilitarianism,
which asks about the utility of general rules, from utilitarian generalization, which for
every act A asks what would happen if everyone did A. I am collapsing the two here by
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our common-sense moral views: it rules out killing the one to save
the five, for example, since we understand the disutility of a general
rule permitting such killings.
To evaluate general rules, however, we may naturally employ
generalization arguments. Indeed, Pogge's analysis of the Kantian
categorical imperative that I quoted above can readily be regarded
as a formula for rule-consequentialist evaluation: to find out if a
rule must be adopted, ask what the world would be like if everyone
were permitted to disobey it. 40 What I have been calling the "consequentialist" interpretation of the fourfold root structure is understood more properly as an act-consequentialist interpretation (as
Wasserman points out); and what I have been calling the "deontological" interpretation of the fourfold root may be regarded just as
easily as a rule-consequentialist version. Viewed in this way, my argument so far in the present paper has amounted to a defense of the
rule-consequentialist reading of the fourfold root over the act-consequentialist reading.
It may be objected to this facile assimilation of deontological
generalization and rule-consequentialism that Kantian and consequentialist generalization differ greatly in the underlying view of
human life that motivates the arguments. For Kant, the universalizability formula follows from the fact that moral laws are binding
universally, and that in turn follows from an underlying concern
with human equality. Though the world that confronts us is riddled
with inequality in goodness and ability, our moral agency resides in
selfhood that is profoundly egalitarian; and the moral law binds us
all precisely because we are all moral equals. For me to permit myself to do something without being able to will that everyone else
also be permitted to do it is tantamount to treating myself as a special case, a cut above the rest of humanity. In chapter three of Lawyers andJustice, I argue that the outrage we often feel at lawbreakers
arises from our sense that they are treating themselves as special
cases; 4 1 thus, the argument of chapter three is Kantian in an important sense.4 2
suggesting that generalization arguments are essential for assessing the utility of general
rules.
40. I do not mean to argue that Kant was a consequentialist: Kant's criteria for accepting a universal duty are more stringent than typical consequentialist criteria. Most
importantly, Kant insisted that one can will maxims to be available only if conduct pursuant to them does not conflict or fail to harmonize with any person's status as an end in
itself. (I take this paraphrase of Kant's formula from T. Pogge, supra note 38, at 26.)
41. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 34.
42. See also Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111 (1988),
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Consequentialists, on the other hand, respond to rather different concerns. Much of the attractiveness of consequentialism is that
it locates the basis of moral decisions in real-world, non-transcendent considerations: the consequences of actions. 43 The attractiveness of consequentialism derives from its reminder that our
individual acts have worldly consequences, for which we are partly
responsible. Thus, where Kantian theories respond to our sense
that, worldly trappings apart, we are all at bottom each others'
equals, the fundamental attractions of consequentialist systems lie
in their this-worldliness and their antifatalistic sense that consequences are not destinies but the outcomes of human choices.
In my view, however, this difference in motivation need not
mark a decisive watershed between the two theories. After all, I
have said that a Kantian applying the generalization test must look
to the real-world consequences of a universal permission to act in a
certain way, and likewise a consequentialist surely may number fairness and unfairness among the consequences that matter.
Let me elaborate the latter point. Utilitarianism always has
been the most influential version of consequentialism, and its hallmark is precisely that it disregards consequences other than welfare.
There is, however, no compelling reason for regarding welfare as
the only morally relevant characteristic of states of affairs.4 4 If two
distributions of goods achieve identical levels of welfare, but one
distribution is much fairer than the other, even a consequentialist
should prefer the fair distribution.4 5 This suggests that our inventory of factors relevant to the rightness of acts should include moral
properties of states of affairs, such as their fairness, as well as nonmoral properties, such as their contribution to welfare. The relevant "moralized" properties of states of affairs may include the fact
that a state of affairs is unfair, or that it violates someone's rights, or
that it results from someone doing her duty, or that it involves the
which spells out a similarly Kantian underpinning for the practice of retributive
punishment.
43. See B. WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 89-90 (1972).
44. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Luban, The Quality ofjustice, 66
DEN. U.L. REV. 381, 393-95 (1989).
45. [Tjhe goodness or badness of a complex state of affairs is not a function
merely of the goodness or badness of its parts. A certain set of goods distributed in one way between a number of people may constitute an intrinsically
better state of affairs than the same set distributed differently. And the appeal
to "fairness" seems to rest on the principle that the best possible state of affairs
is reached when the group of producers and that of enjoyers is as nearly identical as possible.
Broad, On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics, 26 INT'LJ. ETHICS 377, 388 (1916).
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corruption of a virtuous person. Consequentialist theories that in-

clude moral as well as nonmoral properties of states of affairs in
their inventories of "the good" are usually referred to as "ideal utilitarianism,"146 though "ideal consequentialism" would be a more
precise name, since such theories are not strictly speaking utilitarian
theories at all. A form of deontological generalization that takes
consequences (both moral and extra-moral) into account, and an
ideal rule-consequentialism that values dutifulness and fairness
seem awfully close to each other.4

7

46. Ideal utilitarianism originated in Broad, supra note 45.
47. In recent years, anticonsequentialist critics have objected additionally that consequentialism-utilitarian, ideal, or otherwise-demands too much of us. Rule-consequentialism always demands that we engage in practices that maximize the good,
regardless of the sacrifice. Thus, consequentialism seems to imply that I must spend all
my evenings and weekends volunteering at the shelter for the homeless, up to the point
at which my exhaustion and despondency make me a marginally worse agent of the
good, or outweigh the good I do. I must volunteer at the shelter, that is, unless some
even more worthwhile cause lays claim to my evenings and weekends. Clearly, such a
view of what morality requires. is crazy. This objection to consequentialism is by now
standard, but it originated in Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in J.J.C. SMART & B.
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75 (1973). See also Wolf, Moral Saints, 79J.
PHIL. 419, 419 (1982) ("moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not
constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational
or good or desirable for a human being to strive"). As Gilbert Harman nicely puts the
point,
Consider your own present situation. You are reading a philosophical book
about ethics. There are many courses of action open to you that would have
much greater social utility. If, for example, you were immediately to stop reading and do whatever you could to send food to places like Africa or India,
where it is scarce, you could probably save hundreds, even thousands of lives,
and could make life somewhat more tolerable for thousands of others. That is
something you could do that has a greater utility than anything you are now
doing; it probably has a greater utility than anything you are ever going to do in
your whole life. According to utilitarianism, therefore, you are not now doing
what you ought morally to be doing and this will continue to be true throughout your life. You will always be doing the wrong thing; you will never be doing what you ought to be doing.
G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY 157 (1977).
However, the culprit here is not the basic consequentialist idea that we should judge
the rightness and wrongness of actions by looking at their consequences. The real culprit is the additional claim that after rank-ordering possible outcomes of one's actions
according to the goodness of their consequences one must then choose the single action
that maximizes the good. Instead, one could simply set a less demanding threshold than
maximizing the good while still operating in a generally consequentialist framework.
This idea appears in a paper by Judith Lichtenberg, and has received extensive development in works by Michael Slote, who has coined the term "satisficing consequentialism"
to refer to forms of consequentialism that allow one to do less than maximize the good,
provided that one does good over a certain threshold. See Lichtenberg, supra note 28, at
554-55; M. S'LOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING 1-31 (1989); M. SLOTE, COMMON-SENSE MORALITY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM 35-59 (1985). Another approach allows an agent certain
"prerogatives" to refrain from maximizing the good; these prerogatives appear as limi-
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In Lawyers andJustice, I generalized the distinction between actand rule-consequentialism by contrasting "Acts Over Policies"
moral theories with "Policies Over Acts" moral theories. 48 The former, exemplified by act-consequentialism, takes the individual act as
the logical subject of moral evaluation; the latter, exemplified by
rule-consequentialism, takes as the logical subject of moral evaluation the general policy or rule that the particular act implements.
My current defense of rule-consequentialism may puzzle readers of
Lawyers andJustice, since in chapter six I offered a sustained critique
of Policies Over Acts. 49 The contradiction, however, is merely apparent. I criticized Policies Over Acts only for denying that acts are
proper subjects of moral evaluation. This criticism does not apply
to the version of rule-consequentialism contained in the fourfold
root. Prima facie general duties may be overridden in exigent circumstances, and thus we must always be ready to scrutinize particular acts to determine if the circumstances are exigent. In chapter
seven, I again faulted rule-consequentialism, this time for ignoring
the fact that duties differ in their strength.50 But the whole purpose
of the fourfold root is to help us understand the different strengths
of legitimate duties, and thus the fourfold root yields a version of
rule-consequentialism that escapes this criticism as well.
But is it actually rule-consequentialism, or a form of deontology? I have said that the fourfold root employs a generalization
argument common to Kantianism and rule-consequentialism.
Moreover, I have said that Kantianism and ideal rule-consequentialism respond to the same underlying values; I have added that Kant's
question whether an agent could will that all other agents be permitted to undertake an action cannot be answered without empirical
assessment of the consequences of such a universal permission. 5' In
the end, I believe, it is the generalization argument and the assessment of consequences that it demands that matter to legal ethics,
not the theoretical baggage the argument totes. Moral theory aims
tations on what remains a maximizing framework. See S. SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS 14 (1982). These approaches appear to avoid the prob-

lem that consequentialism asks too much. Indeed, such strategies bring
consequentialism into rough alignment with deontological theories, which typically distinguish obligatory from supererogatory good actions.
48. See D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 117-18.
49. See id. at 120-25.
50. Id. at 129 n.4.
51. This is a highly controversial point of Kant interpretation, and my reading follows T. Pogge, supra note 38, at 2-10.
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to systematize and explain our modes of moral deliberation and discourse, but it is those modes of thought, and not the competing theories, that matter to us in practice; as a morally troubled admirer
once complained to Kant, "Now put yourself in my place and either
damn me or give me solace. I read the metaphysic of morals and the
categorical imperative, and it doesn't help a bit."-52 To the momentous question between deontology and rule-consequentialism we
may therefore be tempted to echo the famous moralist Butler
(Rhett, that is) and answer: Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.
II.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SOUL

The conflict between role morality and common morality marks
a conflict within the self-even, if I may put it melodramatically, a
conflict between two selves within us. One is the "social" self made
up by the roles we play, while the other is the self that we all harbor
within, that-in some sense-we all are: the self that holds itself
free and aloof from total immersion in any role. Treating role morality as the "default" position in its conflicts with common morality
in effect gives priority to the social self; and this marks an important
departure from a view expressed in Lawyers andJustice, according to
which the two selves, or modes of regarding our selves, are equally
fundamental. I shall now attempt to justify this change in view.
In Lawyers andJustice, I insisted on the centrality of the questions
"who are we beyond the roles we play? How do we account for the
fact that roles grip us, but only lightly or partially?" 3 I worried that
viewing oneself as a kind of glassy essence independent of social
roles "lapses into an incoherent transcendental romanticism." 5 4 As
Roberto Unger has stated, a human being cannot live a worthwhile
life fighting "a perpetual war against the fact of contextuality, a war
55
that he cannot hope to win but that he must continue to wage."
But it is equally clear that flatfootedly identifying one's self with
one's roles devastates the human spirit; as Unger explains this side
of the dilemma, "The individual may vanish-to a greater or lesser
extent, he will vanish-into a ready-made social station and find
himself recast as a helpless placeholder in the grinding contrast of
52. Letter from Maria von Herbert to Kant (Aug. 1791), in KANT: PHILOSOPHICAL
1759-99, at 175 (A. Zweig ed. 1967) [hereinafter KANT: PHILOSOPHI-

CORRESPONDENCE

CAL CORRESPONDENCE].

53. D. LuBAN, supra note I, at 126.
54. Id.
55. R.M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY

ON PERSONALITY

36 (1984).
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genders, classes, communities, and nations. "56
This dilemma forms the deep motivation of the debate between
act- and rule-consequentialism, and for the remainder of this discussion I shall focus on this debate. The act-consequentialist proceeds
from a deep intuitive sense that our freedom to choose, and thus to
shake ourselves free from the demands of our roles, is unbounded.
We live our lives one moment, or at any rate one episode, at a time,
and thus we must scrutinize the consequences of our actions one
moment or episode at a time. From this perspective it seems like a
cowardly denial of freedom and responsibility to bring about inferior consequences simply because a prior rule or duty tells us to. As
Bernard Williams writes (in a passage I quoted in Lawyers andJustice):
"Whatever the general utility of having a certain rule, if one has actually reached the point of seeing that the utility of breaking it on a
certain occasion is greater than that of following it, then surely it
would be pure irrationality not to break it?" 5 7 Consequentialism, I
have said, arose from the desire to replace morality founded on superstition and taboo with concern for the this-worldly consequences
of our actions. 58 Rule-consequentialism seems from this standpoint
to mark an incomprehensible and retrograde fetishism of rules and
duties.
The rule-consequentialist, on the other hand, emphasizes the
importance of stable expectations. Without rules to which we adhere and roles that we play with some degree of confidence-inspiring predictability, life would be unbearable. Moreover, as Unger
56. Id. at 96.
57. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 102.
58. For the classical utilitarians, much of religiously-based morality amounted to superstition. Aldous Huxley offers a marvelous example when he discusses the history of
hygiene and sanitation. In the middle ages, filth was conceived to be part of the human
condition:
God has decreed that "the mother shall conceive in stink and nastiness."
That there might be a remedy for stink and nastiness-namely soap and
water-was a notion almost unthinkable in the thirteenth century ....

[E]ven

if soap had been abundant, its use for mitigating the "stink and nastiness," then
inseparable from love, would have seemed, to every right-thinking theologian,
an entirely illegitimate, because merely physical, solution to a problem in ontology and morals-an escape, by means of the most vulgarly materialistic trick,
from a situation which God Himself had intended, from all eternity, to be as
squalid as it was sinful. A conception without stink and nastiness would have
the appearance-what a blasphemy!-of being Immaculate.
A. HUXLEY, Hyperion to a Satyr, in TOMORROW AND TOMORROW AND TOMORROW 153

(1956). According to Huxley, one of the leaders in the English campaign for sanitation
in the 19th century was Edwin Chadwick, a disciple of the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham.
Id. at 162.
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argues, stable contexts are crucial in mitigating the jeopardy of social existence and empowering us to take chances in our relations
with each other: they are not just constraints, but "enabling conditions" of growth and self-transformation that acknowledge the essentially social character of our lives. 59 Rule-consequentialism, in
other words, takes the social self as basic.
Unger views the dilemma between role and individuality, constraint and freedom, rule (or role) and act, as an irresolvable conflict
within human life; and so do I. Why, then, do I now give priority to
the claims of role?
I gave the germs of the answer in Lawyers and Justice when I
wrote that we cannot resolve all conflicts between common morality
and role morality in favor of the former. "It would be quite mad for
someone to claim to be acting within a role, while backing out of its
duties whenever the going gets tough."60 As Wasserman has
shown, however, just that would often be the outcome if we simply
elected to balance the demands of role morality against the demands of common morality in each case-the act-consequentialist
alternative to giving (defeasible) priority to the demands of role morality. For, as we have seen, when common morality clashes with
role morality the marginal benefit of violating one's role obligation
may be quite large, whereas the marginal damage to the role itself is
almost always slight. In Wasserman's example, remember, the marginal benefits of diminished zeal in representing a guilty and unrepentant criminal defendant surely will outweigh the marginal
costs to the whole system imposed by diminished zeal in this one
case. 6 ' If an advocate's practice consists largely of the defense of
guilty and unrepentant criminal defendants, as is the case in public
defender offices as well as in white collar criminal defense, this same
59. See R.M. UNGER, supra note 55, at 95-115. The importance and rationality of
precommitment forms a central theme ofJ. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES
IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979). See also Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of
Omission and Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19, 195 (. Elster & R. Slagstad eds. 1988) (pointing out the need to adhere to
certain precommitments in a constitutional democracy). I have myself argued against
the rationality of thoroughgoing precommitment, that is,precommitment that includes
a commitment to refrain from investigating whether precommitments ought to be abandoned; this argument is perfectly compatible with treating precommitments less radically, as defeasible presumptions, as I do here. See Luban, The Paradox of Deterrence
Revived, 50 PHIL. STUD. 129, 138-40 (1986).
60. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 125.
61. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 399. Let me remind the reader that we are stipulating that the crime has been violent and the proposed sentence neither disproportionate
nor racially motivated.
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argument will apply in a great many of her cases. 62 And thus an actconsequentialist criminal defense lawyer ought to diminish her zeal
in all such cases-in far too many, indeed, for her to claim with a
straight face that they are "exceptional"-even if she accepts the
general argument for zeal in criminal defense.
Unless we give priority to the demands of role, a kind of paradox thus results. We may frame it as a contradiction among the
agent's beliefs and actions:
(1) The agent acknowledges the moral worth of the institution
that creates the role, as well as the importance of the role to that
institution and-most importantly for the present argument-the
centrality of a certain duty to the effective functioning of the role.
That means that she agrees that widespread violation of the duty,
even in cases in which it conflicts with common morality, would
damage the role.
(2) Nevertheless, the agent finds herself electing to violate that
duty every time it conflicts with common morality.
(3) And yet she insists that she retains her undiluted commitment to the role.63
What has gone wrong? The answer is illuminating.
The act-consequentialist, I have said, is driven by the sense that
we live our moral lives one act at a time, and thus that shifting focus
from acts to rules-or to the roles underlying the rules-amounts to
a kind of fetishism and irrationalism. For the act-consequentialist,
"my role as a lawyer" is simply an unhelpful abstraction from what
is really real, namely a whole series of individual lawyering episodes.
The act-consequentialist insists that the role is necessarily created
anew in each episode by the decision the lawyer makes in that episode. And that decision must be based on an assessment of the
moral goods and bads of acting in role as those goods and bads manifest
themselves in the current episode.
The act-utilitarian view of professional roles is reminiscent of
Descartes's famous argument that God creates us anew at every
moment:
62. See K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 233 (1985) (former white collar

defense lawyer believes clients usually "objectively guilty"); Bellows, Notes of a Public
Defender, in P. HEYMANN & L. LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS 69, 74
(1988) (former public defender acknowledges that most of his clients were guilty).
63. So-called "externalists," who argue that merely having a moral belief in and of
itself provides no motivation for acting on it (the motivation is external to the belief) will
perhaps find these three propositions less paradoxical than I do; but I am an internalist,
for reasons I have explained elsewhere. See Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33J.
LEGAL EDUC.

636, 645-47 (1983).
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For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite
number of parts, none of which is in any way dependent on
the other; and thus from the fact that I was in existence a
short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence
now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me.64
For the act-consequentialist, the "self" of social role, for purposes
of moral deliberation, should be regarded as nothing more than a
Cartesian sequence of selves that the agent creates anew at each moment by conscious choice. We may call these "episode-selves."
Of course, none of us really experiences the flow of our own
lives as a string of episode-selves, and indeed to do so is the hallmark of a kind of brain damage. 61 We all possess a person-defining
interest in maintaining the integrity of our selves, and this implies a
constancy incompatible with genuinely episodic selfhood. Indeed, it
is precisely the demand for integrity that generates the paradox involved in insisting simultaneously that one occupies a role, that one
understands its obligations, but that one habitually breaks the
role.6 6 Thus, the act-consequentialist suggestion amounts to the
prescription that regardless of the psychological facts of the matter
we should act as though we were episode-selves. Parallel to Kant's
categorical imperative-"Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law" 6 7-we may construct an act-consequentialist imperative: "Act
only according to that maxim that you could will if your life had
begun yesterday and will end when the current episode is over."
The question I wish to explore is what effects this act-consequential-

64. R. DESCARTES, Meditations on FirstPhilosophy, in I THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES 168 (E. Haldane & G. Ross trans. 1955).
65. See H. GARDNER, THE SHATrERED MIND 210-14 (1974). Describing a famous patient of A.R. Luria, Gardner writes:
so overpowered was he by the particular imagery of concrete experiences that
he was severely impaired in generalizing across situations, in classifying together members of the same category, such as variations of the same voice, or
different glimpses of the same visage. This susceptibility to the accidental, and
concomitant insensitivity to the general, proved not infrequently a serious
handicap.
Id. at 212. J. Borges dramatized his plight in the story Funes the Memorious, in LABYRINTHS
(1964). But cf. A. ADKINS, FROM THE MANY TO THE ONE 13-48 (1970) (arguing that
preclassical Greeks lacked our conception of personal identity).
66. Though this may be less paradoxical for someone who is rather thoroughly alienated from her role. See generally J. SEGAL, AGENCY AND ALIENATION: A THEORY OF
HUMAN COHERENCE (in press).

67. I. KANT, supra note 37, at 39.
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ist "categorical imperative" has on our interest in maintaining the
integrity of our selves.
Let us, then, consider the moral biography of a single agent,
singling out the sequence of episodes in which a given role obligation conflicts with some obligation of common morality. We may
assume, based on Wasserman's comparison of the costs and benefits, that in each episode considered by itself the obligation of common morality outweighs the role obligation. In each episode, the
agent confronts a decision: to defect from the role obligation or to
adhere to it.

Take, for example, a hypothetical public defender we shall call
Cecilia, whose docket contains many guilty, violent, and unrepentant clients. Cecilia accepts the moral importance of zealous
advocacy in criminal defense, and understands herself as a faithful
and stalwart adherent to the advocate's role. Indeed, understanding
herself that way is essential to her integrity as a lawyer-what we
may call her "professional integrity." Her professional integrity will
be one important component of her moral integrity as a whole. Can
she maintain that professional integrity if she obeys the act-consequentialist imperative and behaves as though she were not a single
Cecilia but a chronological series-a "community"--of episodeselves?
The answer is no. We are supposing, remember, that doing the
morally right thing is essential to Cecilia's sense of integrity, professional as well as personal. When Cecilia narrows her focus to today's case she identifies Cecilia with today's episode-self, and
today's episode-self has an overarching interest in its doing the right
thing-creating the best consequences in the current case. That, we
have assumed, implies defecting from the role obligation, since doing so will work only slight harm to the adversary system and accomplish a greater good by incapacitating her dangerous client.
Even if we suppose that each episode-self also has an interest in
Cecilia's professional integrity over the span of her whole career,
and does not simply dismiss the whole career as an ephemeral ruleconsequentialist fiction, it will still defect in the current case. That is
because an analogue to Wasserman's argument that the benefits of
defecting from the role outweigh the costs in today's case applies
among Cecilia's episode-selves in the same way that it applies
among the members of the entire criminal defense bar. Regardless
of what she does in her other cases-regardless, that is, of what her
other episode-selves do-the marginal faithlessness to her role entailed by a single defection from zeal in today's case will be slight.
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And just as Cecilia's professional integrity over her whole career will
not be much harmed by today's faithlessness, it will not be much
aided by today's fidelity. Since the gain in episode-self integrity outweighs the loss in Cecilia's professional integrity over her whole career, Cecilia ought to defect in today's case regardless of what she
does in other cases (what her other episode-selves do).
In the language of game theory, the choice to defect dominates
the choice to adhere to the role obligation: it is better from the
point of view of Cecilia's integrity regardless of the choices of
Cecilia's other episode-selves.
Or is it? The same reasoning applies in tomorrow's case, and in
next week's case; put them all together, and she has been driven
entirely out of the role, her professional integrity in tatters. That is
the paradox: what is morally right, and essential to her integrity on
an episodic, or case-by-case basis, is disastrous when the cases are
68
taken collectively.
I have organized the problem in this way to exhibit that
Cecilia's problem is a version of the much-studied problem of collective
action: the problem that self-interested actors typically underprovide themselves with collective goods. Here, the "collective good"
is Cecilia's professional integrity, and the self-interested actors are
Cecilia's various episode-selves. Collective action problems ordinarily arise among groups of people; but once we have come to regard
our own career as a sequence of episodes, as an act-consequentialist
must, then the problem arises equally among the "group" of our
69
episode-selves.
The problem of collective action is simply one instance of a
more general problem, also much studied by game theorists: this is
the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma, a situation in which the individually-rational decisions of many agents lead to a collectively irrational
or self-defeating outcome.70 Cecilia's difficulty may be understood
68. This example illustrates how the integrity of Cecilia's role can be nickel-anddimed away by her commitment to common morality. More common, I expect, is the
opposite phenomenon: corruption by inches of our common moral commitments by the
nagging compromises of our professional roles. In either case, I believe, the dynamics
are more or less the same.
69. See generally M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 5-36 (rev. ed. 1971) (explaining how the collective action

problem arises). I discuss collective action problems in D. LUBAN, supra note I, at 36467. The idea of regarding single individuals as multiple selves, so that problems of collective decision-making may arise for a single agent, is explored in THE MULTIPLE SELF
(J. Elster ed. 1985).
70. The literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma is vast, but perhaps the most accessible
work for the general reader is R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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as an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, where her n episodeselves are the players of the game.
All this may suggest that act-consequentialist reasoning is not
as rational as it seemed at first blush. But I do not accept this conclusion. As game theorists have come to realize, the paradoxical
character of the Prisoner's Dilemma signals a deep contradiction between two conceptions of rationality, both of which are highly persuasive. One, as we have seen, is dominance: if option A is worse than
option B regardless of what others-including other episodeselves-do, it is rational to choose B. (If zealous advocacy is worse
than defecting in the present case regardless of what she does in
other cases, Cecilia should defect.) The other is best expected consequences: if we can expect that, when the smoke clears, pursuing A
will have led to an overall worse outcome than pursuing B, it is rational to choose B. (If defecting will lead overall to a self-defeating
collapse of Cecilia's professional integrity, she is better off adhering
to her role obligation.) The Prisoner's Dilemma constructs a situation in which dominance reasoning and best expected consequences
reasoning diverge; hence the paradox. 7 '
All of this may strike the reader as merely an arid exercise in
cleverness. Annette Baier, dismissing game theoretic moral philosophy as a "male locker room," once wrote that "preoccupation with
prisoner's and prisoners' dilemma is a big boys' game, and a pretty
silly one too."' 7 2 I sympathize with this view-and yet I am also convinced that a self can be divided against itself (I know that my self too
often is). I am convinced that wholeness and integrity are difficult
achievements that we can never take for granted; that in the quest
for integrity there are many paths to well-intentioned self-defeat;
and-most to the point-that the reasoning that creates the problem of collective action lies on one of the most familiar of those
paths to me, and, I trust, to you. Quite simply, collective action
For a proof that collective action problems take the form of Prisoner's Dilemmas, see R.
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 25-28 (1982).
71. A key discovery in the analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma was David Lewis's
proof that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a form of Newcomb's problem, a philosophical
conundrum first analyzed by Robert Nozick that has typically been taken to illustrate the
divergence between dominance and best expected consequences. See Lewis, Prisoners'
Dilemma Isa Newcomb Problem, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 235 (1979); Nozick, Newcomb's Problem
and Two Principles of Choice, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL G. HEMPEL 114-46 (N. Rescher
ed. 1969). These papers, together with other major contributions to this analysis, are
collected in PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION: PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND
NEWCOMB'S PROBLEM (R. Campbell & L. Sowden eds. 1985). See also Lewis, 'Why Ain'cha
Rich?', 15 Nous 377 (1981).
72. Baier, What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?, 19 Nous 53, 54 (1985).
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analyses are among the most compelling metaphors we have for the
political economy of the soul.
The upshot of our Cecilia example is this. The tension between
common morality, understood as a form of ideal act-consequentialism, and role morality, understood as a form of ideal rule-consequentialism, signals a deep divide between two profoundly
compelling conceptions of reason. In Lawyers andJustice, I had expressed hope that these conflicting demands could simply be balanced against each other;7 3 but the present analysis proves that
straightforward balancing systematically unravels the agent's longterm integrity, her stability within her role.
If, on the other hand, we regard the demands of role morality,
justified by the fourfold root inquiry, as defeasible presumptions,
then stability becomes possible once more. I now see that this manner of understanding roles actually follows from the conclusion of
chapter six of Lawyers andJustice, where I wrote:
Our independence from roles derives from the claim of the
moral patient, the person affected by our actions, and not
the agent ....

Such a moral patient cannot be identified

with a role, because human woes do not respect role
boundaries. Trouble, which cuts across roles, takes us to
the lowest common denominator of all roles-and that is
what we call the person ....

Ultimately, we reserve our au-

tonomy from our stations and their duties so that we have
the freedom to respond to persons qua persons-to obey
what one may call the morality of acknowledgment. The situa-

tion is curiously asymmetrical: we are bound to extend to
others a courtesy we are bound to refuse to ourselves. It is
a delusion to think of myself as just a person qua person, a
"me" outside of my social station; but when the chips are
down, it is immoral to think of you as anything less.7"
Calling the extra-social self a "delusion" is strong language; like the
suggestion that our independence from roles "kicks in" only when
we are confronted by a fellow human being in trouble, whose
trouble could not be assuaged were we to remain in our role, it
clearly signals that only in exceptional circumstances concerning the
distress of others should we step out of the duties of our station,
provided of course that those duties are morally justifiable. And
that is just to say that our "station," our role, assumes the default

73. See D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 125.
74. Id. at 126-27 (emphasis in original).

452

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:424

position in our moral lives. 7 5
A few additional words about the "morality of acknowledgment" may perhaps be appropriate at this point. Although I currently am presuming in favor of the duties encapsulated in our
recurrent roles, I do not regard duty as the primary concept of morality. Rather, I join with many contemporary feminist writers in insisting that the primary moral experience is that of responding to, or
sympathizing with, the situation of particular other people. We
often will have reasons for holding that response at arm's length,
and among those reasons the demands of roles, as explicated
through the fourfold root, will figure prominently. Yet the claim of
other people upon us is never absent; as Martin Buber wrote, "All
actual life is encounter."-76 The suffering of others magnifies and
amplifies that claim, calling upon us to acknowledge the other person in ways that our roles cannot anticipate. Deontological moral
systems, by contrast, typically shift the focus from our connection
with others to our self-relation as expressed in the concept of
duty. 7 7 Yet I think this inevitably leads us to set our sights too low;
as Brian Barry nicely expresses it, "a good man cannot be defined as
one who obeys certain minimum standards of duty. Victorian
novels and biographies are thickly populated with self-righteous
prigs who never did anything wrong ... but still managed to make
life hell for everyone around them." 7 8
75. I am unsure whether this conclusion brings me into disagreement with Postema,
Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 286 (D. Luban ed. 1983); I am confident only that a reader who

finds the question of professional integrity compelling ought to read Postema's essay.
76. M. BUBER, I AND THOU 62 (Kaufmann trans. 1970).

77. This conception of deontology motivates the important analysis of legal ethics in
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976); expanded and republished in C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 167-94 (1978)

(retitled "Rights and Roles").
78. Barry, And Who Is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 643 (1979) (review of C. FRIED,
supra note 77). I cannot refrain from offering as a companion to Barry's point a letter
from Kant to his own brother:
Dear brother,
Mr. Reimer, the bearer of this letter, a relative [nephew] of your wife's, my
dear sister-in-law, visited me, and I could not refrain from putting aside my
tremendous chores (which I seldom do) in order to send you greetings. Despite
my apparent indifference, I have thought of you often and fraternally-not only
for the time we are both still living but also for after my death, which, since I am
68, cannot be far off. Our two surviving sisters, both widowed, the older of
whom has 5 grown and (some of them) married children, are provided for by
me, either wholly or, in the case of the younger sister, by my contribution to St.
George Hospital, where provision has been made for her. So the duty of gratitiude [sic] for our blessings that is demanded of us, as our parents taught us,
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In chapter three of Lawyers andJustice, I addressed, briefly and
no doubt inadequately, one of the most ancient philosophical
problems about law: the problem of determining whether laws are
ever a source of moral obligation.7 9 The heart of my solution to this
problem is that whenever laws amount only to a "vertical" relation
between government-"the state"-and its subjects, they create no
moral obligations. They amount to nothing more than commands.
However, whenever laws can rightly be viewed as (instituting) cooperative schemes among citizens-when they establish "horizontal"
relations-the possibility of obligation arises, generated out of solidarity with our fellows and respect-for them.8" Some laws establish
horizontal relations among us, but some do not. As a result, some
laws are a source of moral obligation, but some are not. To the
extent that lawyers disrupt valid legal cooperative schemes, they
wrong their fellows, and thus, the principle of partisanship, which
requires lawyers to treat all laws as mere obstacles to or instruments
of client interest, cannot be correct.
Wasserman accepts my four basic points: (i) that "vertical"
laws-commands-are no source of moral obligations; (ii) that
"horizontal" laws-social cooperative schemes-can be a source of
moral obligation; (iii) thus, that we lie under an obligation to respect
some, but not all, laws; and (iv) that the principle of partisanship
therefore fails. He differs from me over the exact conditions under
which horizontal laws create moral obligations. 8 '
In a sense, then, I suspect that Wasserman's differences with me
are not major. Indeed, I believe that we may agree even more than
Wasserman thinks, for some of the differences he finds with my arwill not be neglected. I would be pleased to receive news of your own family
and its situation.
Please greet my dear sister-in-law. I am, ever affectionately,
Your loyal brother,
I. Kant
Letter from I. Kant to J.H. Kant (Jan. 26, 1792), in KAN'T: PHILOSOPHICAL CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 52, at 185. Every detail of this letter is delectable, but none more so
than the signature. With commendable restraint, the editor comments, "Judging from
this letter, Kant's feelings for his siblings were not exceptionally warm." Id. at 185 n.1.
79. See D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 32-47.
80. I offer related arguments about the primacy of horizontal over vertical relations
in the theory of national sovereignty I developed in Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 160, 167-69 (1980) and The Romance of the Nation-State, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 392
(1980). I further develop these themes in Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989) [hereinafter Luban, Difference Made Legal].
81. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 404-14.
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gument in Lawyers and Justice are based on what I take to be a misreading. As before, the fault here is mine, for my argument was
excessively elliptical. I wish here to elaborate it. In another sense,
however, the differences between us may run deep; at the end of this
Essay I shall speculate about those differences.
In the subsequent discussion, I will focus on one example from
Lawyers andJustice that Wasserman discusses at some length. "On a
trip to London, you observe people queuing up at a bus stop. How
nice! you think. How unlike Manhattan! Forthwith, you cut into the
front of the line." 8 2 You have done something wrong, but what?
What rules out anarchy in the U.K.? I argue that the obligation to
participate in the queuing arrangement is like the obligation to obey
horizontal laws; I offer the queuing example to motivate my argument that some laws create legitimate moral obligations. Wasserman locates the source of obligation in this example elsewhere, and
concludes that the example has little bearing on the obligation to
obey the law."3 As we shall see, this difference is quite important.
I claimed in Lawyers andJustice that cooperative schemes create
obligations when
(1) they create benefits;
(2) the benefits are general: they accrue, in a sense I shall explain subsequently, to the whole community;
(3) widespread participation in the scheme is necessary for it to
succeed;
(4) the scheme actually elicits widespread participation; and
(5) the scheme is a reasonable or important one.
I should note that my argument in Lawyers andJustice,8 4 including the
three examples to which Wasserman directs his criticism, aimed primarily at showing that (5)-the reasonableness of the cooperative
scheme-should be substituted for the stronger requirement that
(5') the benefits actually are accepted by citizens (either tacitly
or explicitly).
This is a highly significant substitution, for it yields a significantly
more paternalistic account of legal obligation than (5'): on my view,
we may lie under an obligation to participate in reasonable, generally beneficial cooperative schemes even without accepting their
benefits. Many theorists, and indeed several American subcultures-the "rugged individualists," the libertarians, the survivalists,
82. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 40.
83. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 408-4 10.
84. D. LUBAN, supra note 1,at 39-42.
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the Ayn Rand devotees-insist on (5') rather than (5); they view
compulsory cooperative schemes with suspicion, as attempts by the
collectivized multitudes to shanghai free individuals into press
gangs to further alien and often stupid and unnecessary ends. 8 5 In
my view, by contrast, the invention of such cooperative schemes lies
at the heart of the human condition. They are not merely conveniences, or merely optional; and communitarians harping on "the
social nature" of human life are not simply whistling Dixie.
Where does law fit into this picture? Cooperative schemes involving many people are hard to organize. Sometimes they require
coordinating the behavior of multitudes; sometimes they require
breaking deadlocks; and sometimes they face collective action
problems. In many such cases, people acting on their own will find
it virtually impossible to achieve the optimal result-in the language
of game theory, there may be no equilibrium, or the equilibrium
may not be optimal-but an external authority can create a stable
and optimal outcome. This the authority does through law. 8 6
Strictly speaking, such laws are not themselves cooperative schemes;
rather, they are instrumentally essential to cooperative schemes.
Thus, still speaking strictly, laws themselves have no moral authority, though they may be necessary for the creation of schemes that
possess moral authority.8 7 In Lawyers andJustice, I ignored this dis-

tinction, but for my purposes both there and here it is unimportant,
and I happily accept it.
I argued in Lawyers and Justice that noncompliance with a cooperative scheme morally wrongs our fellows who participate in it to
the extent that it expresses disrespect for them. Sometimes noncompliance expresses no such disrespect, and in that case the moral
wrong of noncompliance disappears.
From my point of view, the most characteristic, important, and
interesting such case arises when people engage in conscientious
disobedience to discriminatory laws, as was the case in the civil
rights movement.8 8 Discriminatory laws fail to obligate us because
85. This is the theme of A. Rand's enduringly popular novels FOUNTAINHEAD (1943)
and ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957).
86. Here I am generally followingJ. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231-

52 (1980).

For a mathematical elaboration of the highly restrictive conditions under

which authority can be dispensed with, see M. TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987).

87. See generally Regan, Law's Halo, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 15 (1986).
88. I described my theory as a generalization of Martin Luther King's Letter from the
BirminghamJail, a letter he wrote in vindication of his conscientious disobedience to a
court order enjoining him from protest activities in Birmingham, Alabama. See D.
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they violate condition (2), the "generality requirement," which insists that the benefits of a law accrue to the whole community. In my
characterization of the five necessary conditions for legal obligation,
the generality requirement functions as a kind of equal protection
clause, as I intimated in Lawyers andJustice:
The complexities involved in applying the equal protection
clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment graphically illustrate how hard it can be to determine when a legislative classification, which inevitably produces an unequal
distribution of burdens and benefits, has done so fairly. A
precise statement of the generality requirement will demand at least the complexity of a plausible theory of equal
protection, and that is very complex indeed.8 9
This is put too obliquely, and I fear that Wasserman as well as other
readers missed an implication of this analogy that I should have
spelled out. The textbook summary of equal protection doctrine
will serve to make the point clear. Faced with an equal protection
challenge to a legislative classification, a court must first ascertain
that the classification does not discriminate against historically victimized groups (suspect classes). Having ruled out that possibility,
the court next asks whether the statutory scheme establishing the
classification bears a rational relation to legitimate state ends; if so,
the classification will be upheld even though some individuals lose
by its establishment. To take a familiar example, a law restricting
the practice of optometry-creating a licensing system that classifies
citizens into those permitted to sell eyeglasses and those not-was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court because requiring eyeglass prescriptions bears a rational relation to promoting public
health.90 In my terminology, this statute is generally beneficial even
though some people-those who wished to practice optometry without a license--emerged as losers. A law may be generally beneficial, that is, even
if it is not universally beneficial. This does not mean that distributive
issues or fairness are unimportant: it means only that schemes can
be fair even though they create some losers. 9 1
supra note 1, at 46. I discuss this case, and King's argument, in detail in Luban,
Difference Made Legal, supra note 80. See King, Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 77-100 (1963).
89. D. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 43-44.
90. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955).
91. This will come as no surprise to Rawlsians, who understand fairness to include
the "difference principle," which maintains that inequalities may be justified provided
they make the worst-off members of the group better off than they would be otherwise,
nor to proponents of wealth maximization, who believe that a statute counts as generally
LUBAN,
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It may seem like doublethink to insist that a law can count as
generally beneficial even though it renders some people worse off.
Let me add a few remarks to make this idea more palatable and also
to ward off misunderstandings.
I said earlier that we lie under an obligation to respect some,
but not all, laws. I thus reject an all-or-none approach to the moral
authority of law. It may seem that the only alternative to all-ornothing legal obligation is an atomistic approach, according to
which our obligation to respect a given law is determined by examining that law alone. This alternative, however, cannot be right
either. For I have just argued that any given law, taken in isolation,
may satisfy the generality requirement even though a certain person
or group loses; and, in theory, the same person or group could lose
as a result of every law, even though each law satisfies the generality
requirement. In that case, however, the losing person or group has
been treated so unfairly in a cumulative sense that no legal obligation should be recognized. The atomistic approach cannot account
for this cumulative sense of unfairness.
The point is that even though we must not simply lump all laws
together by asking about our obligation to obey "the law" (meaning
every law), we should assess the fairness of each law against the background of other laws as well as on its own terms. The cumulative
fairness of a whole set of laws requires dispersing the losses imposed by them among all the various groups and members of society: the same group that has lost out through the licensing of
optometry should not lose out in most other statutorily-imposed
classifications as well. Thus, the fairness and generality of a law
means that the inequalities it creates are not in and of themselves
unjustified, but also that they are cancelled out rather than reinforced by other laws. If the enactment of each new law makes the
rich richer and the poor poorer, the legal system is not fair even if
its component laws seem fair taken individually; or, to put it more
accurately, the component laws are not individually fair even if they
seem to be when they are scrutinized out of context.9 2 When the
beneficial even if it creates losers, provided that the winners could compensate the
losers. In my view, however, an appropriate concept of fairness must take into account
the positions of other members of society than the worst-off member (Rawls) or the
average member (wealth-maximization and, generally, average utilitarians). See also McClennen, ConstitutionalChoice: Rawls vs. Harsani, in PHILOSOPHY IN EcONOMICS 93 U. Pitt
ed. 1981).
92. The view of fairness that I am proposing here has much in common with the view
that Michael Walzer calls "complex equality." On this view, equality may be satisfied
even though individual goods are distributed unequally, provided that winning the lion's
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whole system is fair in this cumulative sense, it seems more plausible
that a single law can be fair even though it creates losers.
The important point to take from this discussion is that a law
may satisfy (1)-(5), and thus impose moral obligations upon us, even
though we do not benefit from it. Wasserman errs, therefore, when
he attributes to me the view that our duty of fair play rests on the
benefits we receive from cooperative schemes9 3 and thus that "our
indignation at the person who cuts in front [of a queue] is aroused
by her ingratitude" at the benefits conferred by the queuing arrangement.9 4 Indeed, I intended my argument as an alternative to
the Socratic theory that we owe obligations of gratitude to the state
for benefits received. 95 The role of benefits-condition (1) abovein my argument is more indirect than Wasserman suggests. Only if
a legally-created scheme creates benefits (for someone) does it make
sense to regard noncompliance with the scheme as an expression of
disrespect for our fellows; as I wrote in Lawyers andJustice, "If the
members of my community . . . choose to stand immersed up to

their necks in the outhouse tank, it is hard to see why I have good
reason to go along with them." 9 6 The creation of benefits is necessary for us to regard the plan as a morally significant scheme of social cooperation; but having established that it is such a scheme, the
moral obligation to participate follows from the requirement to respect our fellows, regardless of the actual receipt of benefits by any
particular person.
It follows that when Wasserman protests that "[w]e would be
equally indignant [at someone skipping in queue] even if the circurnstances denied her any short- or long-term advantage from the
queuing arrangement ' 9 7 he has not raised an objection to my view
but to a gratitude-based theory of legal obligation that I reject. On
my view, the short- or long-term advantage you derive from a queuing arrangement need have nothing to do with whether you lie
under an obligation to wait your turn. Wasserman and I agree completely about this case.
Wasserman, however, disagrees with me about the more genshare of any particular good carries no implications for how one will do in the distribution of other goods. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 3-30 (1983).
93. See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 413-14.
94. Id. at 409.
95. I did, however, criticize the argument from gratitude explicitly. See D. LUBAN,
supra note 1, at 37.
96. Id. at 44.
97. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 409.
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eral moral basis for queuing. I suggest that queuing establishes a
cooperative scheme satisfying (1)-(5), and thus that the fairness and
reasonableness of queuing obligate us to respect the arrangement,
whereas Wasserman believes that the force of the example derives
from "our pre-existing duty to defer to those who have arrived first.
A rule of 'first come, first served' equalizes the burden of waiting in
settings in which variations in need are relatively slight and impractical to ascertain .. ."98 Wasserman finds, we may say, a kind of
natural law basis for the queuing arrangement: queuing is merely a
scheme that "allows us to honor our pre-existing duty to defer to
those who have arrived first." 99
If morality or natural law truly mandated first-come-firstserved, however, we ought to regard all other schemes for equalizing the burden of waiting as morally objectionable. To take the
most common alternative to single-line queuing, we ought to condemn the multiple queues at supermarkets and fast food outlets on
moral grounds, since they do not follow the "natural law" of firstcome-first-served.' 0 ° That seems odd to me. Suppose, moreover,
that I reach the counter at Benny's Burrito Barn before a person in
the next line who I observed coming in before me. If we truly recognize first-come-first-served as an antecedent duty, we ought to
agree that I am obligated to offer that person the opportunity to go
before me. Perhaps so; but here again my intuitions do not lead me
to think anything of the sort.
Indeed, I detect an inconsistency in Wasserman's own views
over just this point. Wasserman at one point likens multiple-line
queuing arrangements in fast food outlets to a kind of lottery in
which customers take "the luck of their lane."''
That is precisely
how it seems to me as well; but in that case he should acknowledge
either that first-come-first-served is no natural law antecedent duty
or else-a more complex view-that it is a peculiar sort of natural
law duty that arises only when it is realized in a cooperative scheme
and disintegrates when the cooperative scheme actually in place fails
to institute it. I do not know exactly what to think about the latter
alternative, other than that it differs from my own view only in a
rarified and metaphysical way.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. In conversation, Wasserman has painted the memorable picture of Moses descending from the mountain to confront the Israelites carousing about the Golden Calf,
bearing a stone tablet carrying the legend "First come, first served!"
101. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 410.
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Why might Wasserman insist that queuing arrangements
merely fulfill an antecedent duty of fairness rather than creating
such a duty as I argue? My guess is that it is because first-come-firstserved seems like the only fair scheme for allocating "the burden of
waiting in settings in which variations in need are relatively slight
and impractical to ascertain."10 2 Perhaps he is right about this; perhaps there really is something morally deficient about multiple-lane
queuing in the supermarket. After all, we might reflect, the persuasive force of the queuing example lies precisely in the fact that we all
agree on the intuitive moral force of queuing; if queuing were just
one of many equally fair patterns for boarding a bus, we probably
would not find the example compelling. When there is only one fair
scheme it seems to pre-exist the practical arrangements that realize
it.

In that case, however, I think that we should shake free from the
example long enough to recall that the overwhelming majority of
community purposes can be realized fairly in a variety of ways. Consider the income tax. Most of us agree that tax burdens ought to be
distributed fairly, but what does that mean? Does it mean equal tax
rates? Equal loss of utility? Equal loss of percentage of utility?
Clearly, arguments can be made for various such schemes, and even
after settling the general question it would be strange indeed if only
one possible tax schedule filled the bill.' 0 3 Or consider bankruptcy.
Is it really plausible that only one set of bankruptcy laws fairly distributes the losses among creditors? 0 4 Indeed, even natural law
proponents deny that natural law dictates uniquely justifiable solutions to legal problems. In the words of John Finnis,
in Aquinas's view, the law consists in part.. . of rules which
are "derived from natural laws like implementations
[determinationes] of general directives." This notion of
determinaio he explains on the analogy of architecture (or
any other practical art), in which a general idea or "form"
(say, "house", "door", "door-knob") has to be made determinate as this particular house, door, door-knob, with
specifications which are certainly derived from and shaped
by the general idea but which could have been more or less
different in many (even in every!) particular dimension and
102. Id. at 409.
103. See Young, Progressive Taxation and the Equal Sacrifice Principle, 32J. PUB. ECON. 203,
212-13 (1987); H. Young, When Is a Tax Increase Fairly Distributed? 5-12 (July 1987)
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author).
104. SeeJ. FINNIS, supra note 86, at 188-93.
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In the vast array of cases in which many different fair determinationes

of the same collective end are possible, we will lie under no antecedent duty to bring our behavior into line with any one of these
determinationes. Only after one of them has been enacted legally will

we find ourselves obligated by fairness to respect the law. In such a
case, I think, we will not be tempted to locate the obligation of fair
play in antecedent duties.
Wasserman writes, "In both the bus-queue and blocked-lane
cases, the obligation we feel to comply with the cooperative scheme
is contingent upon our acceptance of the priority rule it enforces."'" 6 With the above observations in mind, I would recast his
point in the negative: the obligation we feel to comply with the cooperative scheme is contingent on our not finding the priority rule it
enforces morally objectionable. Or, in the terminology I introduced
earlier, the obligation is contingent on our not finding the priority
rule unfair, unbeneficial, or unreasonable. When only one fair priority rule exists, then Wasserman's phrasing and mine coincide: if
we do not find a rule unfair and only one rule is a candidate, then we
morally agree with it. But in the case of real-life laws, when many
reasonable schemes are possible, then Wasserman asks too much:
he conditions the moral obligation to comply with a cooperative
scheme on its unique suitability, rather than its generally beneficial
reasonableness.
In the end, I believe that this seemingly-minor difference may
run very deep. When we admit that our fellows hold the power to
obligate us to participate in schemes with which we disagreeschemes that may not be utterly brilliant or maximally fair-we have
made an important concession of our own liberty. We acknowledge
that we can be bound by social practices and histories that are imperfect and largely arbitrary. Few of us will derive comfort from this
10 7
acknowledgment, for we all harbor a profound rebelliousness.
The desire to restrict our obligations to those legal schemes that are
105. Id. at 284. For Finnis's entire discussion of this theme, see id. at 284-87.
106. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 410.
107. The writer and political scientist Victor Alba, who fought on the republican side
in the Spanish Civil War, once told me a story that beautifully illustrates this rebelliousness. Reminiscing about the anarchists, Alba recollected that they were wonderful but
impossible. Often an anarchist wandering the lines at night would give the wrong password and be met with a fusillade of bullets from the sentry. The sentry invariably missed
(Alba: "Anarchists were terrible shots"), and when the wandering trooper approached
and was asked why he had given the wrong password, he would answer: "Why? Because
I have free will, that's why!" According to Alba, this happened not once but many times.
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uniquely reasonable may not differ much in the end from the libertarian's desire to restrict our obligations to those schemes whose
benefits we have explicitly accepted. Both arise from a kind of revulsion at falling into the clutches of other people, though we recognize at the same time that "no man is an island."
Earlier, I argued that the dilemma between role and individuality, constraint and freedom, rule and act, amounts to an irresolvable
conflict within human life. It is romantic excess to insist on absolute
freedom, but every surrender to constraint is a loss of something
precious. If we can find no way out of this dilemma in practice, perhaps we should not be surprised to find it recurring, in one guise or
another, throughout moral and political theory.

